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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
States Should Conform to GILTI, Part 3: Elevator Pitch and Q&A
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Introduction
The 2017 federal tax overhaul slashed the 
corporate income tax rate,1 but also enacted new 
antiabuse provisions targeted at corporate tax 
planning that shifts reported profits to foreign tax 
havens or other foreign low-tax jurisdictions. The 
most important of these antiabuse rules is the 
global intangible low-taxed income regime.
States have also seen their corporate income 
tax bases eroded by corporate tax planning that 
shifts reported profits to foreign tax havens or 
other foreign low-tax jurisdictions. This tax 
planning has deprived states of needed revenue, 
while making their tax systems less fair and less 
efficient because of the economic waste and 
inequities resulting from some corporate 
taxpayers aggressively engaging in these forms of 
tax planning.
GILTI now offers states a tool to combat this 
harmful tax planning. As we have argued 
previously, states can and should make use of this 
tool by conforming to GILTI.2
The essence of our argument can be 
summarized in three sentences. First, states 
should conform to GILTI because there is 
significant evidence that profit shifting is 
substantially eroding their corporate tax bases. 
Second, GILTI is a tool for identifying shifted 
profits. Third, there are many legally and 
analytically sound ways to apportion GILTI 
income to a state.
The remainder of this essay elaborates on and 
supports each of these sentences. But as a 
precursor, it may be helpful to provide 
background to set the stage for our analysis.
Regrettably, most states are not conforming to 
GILTI. Even more regrettably, this fact is now 
being cited as another reason that states should 
not conform to GILTI.
It is of course understandable for taxpayers to 
lobby politicians not to tax them, and we suppose 
somewhat natural — if still fallacious — for a 
victory of brute force to be rationalized as a 
triumph of reason. Yet the arguments for 
conforming to GILTI have no more been defeated 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors counter common 
arguments against state conformity to GILTI, 
arguing that the policy has thus far been 
rejected not on the merits, but rather thanks to 
brute-force corporate lobbying that has been 
rationalized as a triumph of reason.
1
For broader discussion and critique of related aspects of the 2017 
federal tax legislation, see David Kamin et al., “The Games They Will 
Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax 
Legislation,” 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1488-1514 (2019).
2
Darien Shanske and David Gamage, “Why States Can Tax the 
GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967; and Shanske and Gamage, 
“Why States Should Tax the GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 751.
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in the arena of ideas than was mandatory 
worldwide combination, an even better tax policy 
that was also defeated by interest-group politics 
rather than by policy arguments.3 Cynically, the 
end of worldwide combination is now also 
suggested to have been a matter of policy, 
contrary to any plausible claim of fact.
What to do? We have already argued for 
GILTI conformity at length.4 We will try again in 
this essay by framing the argument a little 
differently, with specific and short takeaways.
Our Elevator Pitch in 3 Sentences
(With Commentary)
There is debate as to the scale of corporate 
profit shifting. The global consensus is that it is a 
problem.5 This consensus can be disputed by 
opponents of state conformity to GILTI, but it 
would be wise for states to follow the lead of the 
OECD, the United Kingdom, and the Republican 
Congress that passed GILTI (and the base erosion 
and antiabuse tax) in believing that corporate 
profit shifting is a problem that governments 
should take steps to counter.
Thus, the first sentence of our elevator pitch is: 
States should conform to GILTI because there is 
significant evidence that profit shifting is 
substantially eroding their corporate tax bases.
Further, though GILTI does operate as a 
global minimal tax, it is simultaneously an 
attempt to identify shifted income. Both objectives 
can be and are true. GILTI identifies suspiciously 
high returns, but also grants a foreign tax credit to 
establish a minimum tax. Conceptually, a state can 
opt to use GILTI as a mechanism for identifying 
shifted profits without also using it to establish a 
minimum tax. And why should states seek to 
make sure that a large multinational corporation 
pays at least a minimum amount to foreign 
jurisdictions?
Thus, the second sentence of our elevator 
pitch is: GILTI is a tool for identifying shifted 
profits.
And so a state should conform to GILTI 
insofar as it identifies likely displaced income. 
The next question is how a state should do so. 
First, a state needs a theory as to how much GILTI 
has a U.S. source. Two prominent tax economists 
who proposed a proto-version of GILTI in 2013 
argued for 50 percent because there is evidence 
that this is a rough estimate of the U.S. 
contribution to global research and development.6 
Conforming to the 50 percent deduction of IRC 
section 250 is thus an easy way of building in this 
reasonable analysis.
But then what to do about the 50 percent 
apportioned to the United States? We think just 
using the state’s ordinary apportionment formula 
is reasonable. We think numerous alternative 
options are also reasonable, such as the use of 
GDP.7
Thus, the third sentence of our elevator pitch 
is: There are many legally and analytically 
sound ways to apportion GILTI income to a 
state.
These three sentences are all that is essential, 
but we will nevertheless follow up with some 
anticipatory housekeeping.
Call and Response
Objection 1: But GILTI is foreign income.
There are multiple errors embedded in this 
claim. First, states can tax foreign income; that 
they do not is a matter of historical practice. 
Second, when a state apportions GILTI to itself, it 
3
For the argument as to why now is a particularly good time to 
return to mandatory worldwide combination, see Shanske, “White Paper 
on Eliminating the Water’s Edge Election and Moving to Mandatory 
Worldwide Combined Reporting,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 17, 2018, p. 1181.
4
See Shanske and Gamage, both articles, supra note 2.
5
Jane G. Gravelle, “Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit 
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?” Apr. 26, 2016. (“While the magnitude of 
corporate profit shifting by U.S. multinationals into low or no tax 
countries is uncertain, there is overwhelming evidence of its existence 
and its increase in recent years.”).
6
Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, “Fixing the System: An 
Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax,” 
66(3) Nat’l Tax J. 671, 681 (Sept. 2013).
7
The use of GDP is a reasonable choice made by New Jersey that has 
been subjected to quite unreasonable criticism. We hope some other state 
uses it again. GDP makes sense as a guess for where sales are happening 
and income is being generated. While imperfect, it is at least as good — 
arguably better — than using population. Population is commonly used 
as a secondary rule of reasonable approximation in the Multistate Tax 
Commission’s model allocation and apportionment regs in connection 
with intangibles and services. See MTC, “Model General Allocation & 
Apportionment Regulations With Amendments Submitted for Adoption 
by the Commission” (Feb. 24, 2017). We might have missed it, of course, 
but neither of us recalls such hyperbolic gnashing of teeth in that 
context, which is essentially the same. GILTI is displaced income and so 
we are using a sensible default option, just as one does when there is a 
difficulty locating the ultimate destination of intangibles or services.
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is not taxing foreign income, but rather is using 
reasonable formulas to tax domestic income.8
Response 1: Including apportioned GILTI 
income is taxing domestic — not foreign — 
sourced income.
Objection 2: But GILTI income is, by 
definition, the income of a controlled foreign 
corporation.
This is the same objection, just made more 
loudly and slowly. The objection is technically 
true, but irrelevant, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held many times,9 including twice in this context,10 
that states do not need to divide up income in the 
manner that a taxpayer does so.
Response 2: A state does not need to take a 
taxpayer’s word on where income is earned and, 
in light of the evidence of massive profit 
shifting, states should not just take a taxpayer’s 
word on where income is earned. Instead, a state 
can and should use its own reasonable method 
to determine where income is actually earned.
Objection 3: But GILTI is a minimum tax and 
so, by implication, is not a tool to identify 
income shifting.
It is within a state’s discretion to adopt one 
aspect of GILTI but not another. The Supreme 
Court has made it clear, including in decisions like 
Kraft v. Iowa,11 that the IRC does not preempt state 
revenue design choices. Even more aptly, the 
Court reached this conclusion specifically as to 
nominally foreign income in Container and 
Barclays.12
Response 3: States are permitted to conform 
to part of GILTI to accomplish one of GILTI’s 
policy goals without conforming to all of GILTI.
Objection 4: GILTI is imperfect, with the 
implication being that states should not conform 
to it because it would be so unfair or even 
constitutionally problematic.
As a legal challenge, this flies against what we 
all learn in Con Law I — that taxation decisions 
are subject to rational basis review. If deeply 
imperfect tax laws like California’s Proposition 13 
count as rational, then conforming to GILTI easily 
passes the test to count as rational.13
As a policy matter, it is possible that an 
innocent firm (that is, a firm not involved in profit 
shifting) might face an additional tax burden as a 
result of GILTI. Almost all elements of tax law are 
imperfect, after all, and every major antiabuse 
rule that we know of can be criticized as catching 
some arguably innocent taxpayers in its net. But 
to refrain from enacting antiabuse rules on this 
ground would lead to tax systems falling apart in 
the face of aggressive tax planning.
In any case, we doubt that many firms not 
involved in profit shifting will face substantial 
additional tax burdens as a result of GILTI. 
Moreover, states have at least three tools to 
address this to the extent it does occur. First, 
taxpayers can petition for alternative 
apportionment. Second, if there is a recurring 
problematic pattern, say for very profitable 
service firms with few assets, then state regulators 
could issue regulations as they have in other 
special contexts. Third, taxpayers can opt for 
worldwide combination, which takes into account 
all of a unitary business’s income and factors.
Response 4: As a matter of law, GILTI is more 
than reasonable enough. As a matter of policy, 
states have the tools to mitigate significant 
unfairness in the unlikely event that it arises.
Objection 5: You just mentioned worldwide 
combination. Worldwide combination is the 
worst and GILTI is just a poor form of 
worldwide combination.
Mandatory worldwide combination would 
actually be superior to conforming to GILTI.14 
States only moved away from this approach 
under political pressure, which would be unlikely 
8
And so this disposes of objections based on Kraft v. Iowa, a case 
involving income that was stipulated to be foreign. Kraft General Foods 
Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 505 U.S. 71, 77 (1992). 
(“The only subsidiary dividend payments taxed by Iowa are those 
reflecting the foreign business activity of foreign subsidiaries.”).
9
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); 
Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
10
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 321-31 (1994); 
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983).
11
Kraft, 505 U.S. at 82. See also Shanske, “States Can and Should 
Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law” (June 10, 2019), Ohio North U. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming).
12
Container, 463 U.S. 159; Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. 298.
13
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
14
See Shanske, supra note 3.
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today when the entire OECD is working on profit-
shifting issues. One way you know that 
worldwide combination is a sound policy is by the 
incoherence of objections to it. For instance, some 
contend that various kinds of GILTI conformity 
would be terribly unfair to some taxpayers 
because they do not allow the inclusion of 
sufficient foreign factors, but not so unfair that 
these taxpayers would actually make a 
worldwide election that would permit inclusion 
of all foreign factors (but also require inclusion of 
all income). This illustrates that the argument for 
greater inclusion of foreign factors in GILTI is 
strategic. Partial inclusion is more easily subject to 
manipulation and thus likely to reduce tax 
liability; full inclusion is harder to manipulate and 
so disfavored.
Response 5: Yes, we should go back to 
worldwide combination, but conforming to 
GILTI is a sound first step.
Objection 6: This is just an ad hoc money 
grab.
Are you familiar with Texas’s margin tax? It is 
hard to raise enough revenue to provide services 
that constituents want. Sometimes this results in 
odd taxes. Indeed, it almost always does, as the 
deviations from principle in all taxes are legion. In 
any event, it just so happens that combining a 
profit split (done by GILTI) with apportionment 
of supranormal profits by formula based on 
consumption (how a state would likely conform) 
is the cutting edge of corporate tax theory at the 
moment.15 This is not the place to argue for this 
vision, just to note that in fact GILTI conformity is 
not ad hoc, even if that were a meaningful 
objection.
Response 6: Pairing GILTI with single-sales-
factor apportionment approximates the cutting 
edge in thinking about corporate taxation.
Objection 7: You don’t even need the money!
It is true that times are relatively good for 
many states right now. But state revenue systems 
are volatile and produce a lot less revenue just 
when they have more needs.16 GILTI income is 
likely to be pro-cyclical and states should use it 
accordingly by allocating a generous portion to 
reserve funds or one-time projects.
Response 7: Winter is coming!
Objection/Threat 8: We will move if you 
conform!
A taxpayer that moves because of GILTI will 
not reduce its corporate tax liability, including for 
GILTI, owed to the state it moves from if that state 
uses single-sales-factor apportionment. This is 
because the taxpayer’s customers will not move. 
To be sure, a taxpayer that moved from a state 
would now pay less of other state and local taxes 
to that state, but that is already the case. 
Conforming to GILTI does not change the cost-
benefit analysis.
Response 8: It would be irrational for a 
taxpayer to move because of GILTI conformity 
because GILTI conformity does not increase a 
taxpayer’s tax liability based on its physical 
presence in the state.
Conclusion
To return to the beginning, of course 
taxpayers likely to pay more in taxes under GILTI 
conformity are lobbying state legislators not to do 
so. Yet the policy case for GILTI conformity is very 
strong, and the arguments against it are rather 
weak or inaccurate. In this essay, we are trying to 
clarify matters. If you are — or work for — a state 
legislator considering conforming to GILTI, and if 
you still have questions or concerns, please give 
us a call. 
15
Michael P. Devereux et al., “Residual Profit Allocation by Income,” 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper WP19/01 
(Mar. 22, 2019); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, and 
Michael C. Durst, “Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A 
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,” 9(5) Fla. Tax Rev. 497-553 
(2009).
16
Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).
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